I was not impressed with the Sightline study. It seemed coordinated with the McGinn campaign, especially when he started referring to it all the time. It does not appear to be an objective study.

The issue for state transportation and Sound Transit projects right now might well be: "are we padding the estimates too much?" Sound Transit's huge early bid blunder sent it and the state DOT scrambling to never repeat the same again. The state had performed risk analysis to that we know a little more about the risks associated with cost estimates on these projects - risk analysis that the Danish researcher never considered.

Politicians may move on, but state engineers have huge incentive to keep things on track = their careers.

My own personal opinion aside, it is not exactly fair to only look at Tunnel cost overruns on public projects, or even just public projects alone.

Large scale engineering projects in the area are all subject to geologic surprises that can crop up unexpectedly.

To my recollection, most every major sized project built in the downtown core since the Kingdome has been over budget... and we blew up the Kingdome.

Because this side of the state was underwater 100 million years ago, overun by lahars every 500 years or so, carved by glaciers as recent as 15,000 years ago, and carved by human less than 100 years ago, it is very difficult to map what lies below us.

Some things appear more obvious, especially after the fact. Finding water filled flowing springs underground when they dug the Metro tunnel under Spring Street appears to be humorously unexpected... but short of core samples every 5 feet in every direction, there are always surpises.

Damns Leak. Bus Tunnels Leak. Arena Roofs Leak. People abuse Million dollar Porta Potties.

Then there is US. WE make changes in our design demands. Sometimes it is because we just figured out new ideas. Sometimes it is new challanges (we did not realize issue X until we started the project.

It is not JUST Tunnels that have cost overuns, nor is it JUST Public Projects.
Reports so stated make it sound as if all tunnel folks are irresponsible, or all public project folks are irresponsible. While it does not change the cost overrun potential, we should at least be more aware of the issue when building ANY large scale project, not just the Tunnel, 520 and Mercer mess.

Poorly done. Nobody who reads ENR, or even knows what it is, would believe this "study". Chief reason: Every baseline number they used was at least a decade old. Good lord.

Many agencies, such as Sound Transit, adopted much better estimating methodology about a decade ago. That's why the post-housecleaning Sound Transit has been very successful at predicting cost since that time, even funding current work out of savings from past work. The trend continues as they're something like $115,000,000 (guessing) under budget on the Capitol Hill segments that bid this year. By the same token, projects like schools and libraries (the sorts of thing my company builds) are bidding substantially under budget these days as well.

It's not that they know the price of the tunnel with any precision yet. But the estimates are presumably (not an insider here) using today's more conservative typical methodology, which would account for a moderate level of surprises. And of course the knowledge base is much higher today than it was earlier in the year.

Kudos to Knute for acknowledging that the multi-billion-dollar surface option faces potential to go over budget too.

Jan, your conclusion is absolutely unfounded. The state engineers work for the governor, and they know to keep things quiet during the election season. Engineers *do* try to keep the Political BS off their desks--good engineering must be protected from that. And the engineers on this project are certainly doing their best to make this project happen within the terrible constraints they've been given.

Why haven't we heard any news on the CEVP outcomes in the past five months? I think it is because there is no good news. Indeed, it has already been leaked that they can't construct the deep bore tunnel south of King Street, and that they'll need to use a cut and cover (trench) design down there instead.

It is only a matter of time before the public starts to feel like they've been lied to again.

Jan--
The study was not coordinated with the McGinn campaign. For years, Sightline has been on record as skeptical of large highway building projects. We felt this was an important opportunity to inform a public debate, such as the Seattle city council vote yesterday.

mhays--
It is not true that every baseline number is "at least a decade old." There are two older projects (Mt Baker and the downtown bus tunnel) and two newer project (Beacon Hill and Brightwater). Sound Transit baseline numbers are for 2004 and Brightwater numbers are also for 2004. If you read the study you will find full explanations and citations of the calculations.

-- Eric de Place, Sightline

Jan has it right. The obscure but suddenly now vocal Sightline Institute has a bunch of McGinn hacks in it. Read between the lines, this was a strategically timed release.

The Great Northern (bored) tunnel was built by a few hundred burely men with pickaxes and wheelbarrows a century ago. It is one mile long and thirty feet wide, and has withstood everything mother nature and humankind has thrown at it over that period. The bored tunnel project that is underway is just twice as long and twice as wide, and yet it is presented as some kind of great and risky techological feat, despite a hundred years of progress.

If we can't build a simple tunnel under our city, we should just give up on jets and software and start growing produce in our transportation corridors.

How can anyone assert with a straight face that a $4 or $5 billion tunnel is a "boondoggle," when this amount is mere chump change compared to the $1 trillion so far on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? It's time we stopped shovelling grotesque amounts of money into the furnace of war and started spending it on our own needs, including vital public infrastructure.

As for cost overruns, if some brain-dead Metro engineer hadn't decided to shave a few $$ million worth of cement off the original construction cost, the bus tunnel would have have been light rail ready from the gitgo and wouldn't have needed a lengthy and expensive rebuild 15 years after it was originally completed in 1990.

If tunnels are so inferior to elevate highways, why is the Viaduct beyond its design life, while the Battery Street tunnel, which was built at the same time as the viaduct, is still serviceable?

Some people still cling to the idea that the viaduct can be retrofitted or rebuilt in situ, but not only would that cause many years of paralyzing, expensive gridlock in downtown Seattle, it would produce a less stable, earthquake- and sea level rise-resistant structure than the deep bore tunnel. In the long run, the tunnel is going to be the cheapest way to go, so let's get on with it.

Unter: you blow a good argument with your close. Give up on "Jets"--see growing information about implications of return to escalating oil prices along with "recovery." Software--no problem "Start growing produce in our transportation corridors"--if the global future is as dicey as claimed we may well be getting and keeping transportation corridors, etc. out of our best local farm land.

Best not to get carried away (pun not intended).

Tunnel estimate is 1.9 billion
400 million added/padded covered by tolling
and if that is not enough, 400 million more in tolling.

The 1.9 billion dollar estimate from January has 800 million in padding in the bill that was passed.

The 2.4 billion dollar number is padded already, compounding risk mitigation overages is fueling hyperbole.
But that is a matter of politics, and not project management.

Next, I expect somebody to be unhappy with the selection of colors used in the chart, followed by endless meetings by some disconnected adhoc group.

Is the tunnel a boondoggle? Is the Pope Catholic?
It's an engineer's wet dream, something that they can point to when bidding on other projects.

Can we do without the tunnel? In my opinion, yes we can. It's such a simple test: Close the Viaduct for month to six weeks and see what happens.

In my prediction, the first week will be hard, but it will get better every week until the end of the test period the question will be "Do we want to reopen the Viaduct?"

I wrote about this on my blog:
http://kedamono.wordpress.com/2009/08/28/tear-down-the-seattle-viaduct-and-replace-it-with/

I firmly believe that we don't need a tunnel, we just need to tear down the Alaskan Way Viaduct and do some landscaping.

Re big engineering projects always going over budget (sometimes b/c going way past deadlines): the bridge built to replace the one in Minneapolis that collapsed into the river came in under budget and early. With oversight and strict management, it's not impossible to meet big-project goals.

"Danish researcher Flyvbjerg calls the result 'survival of the un-fittest'. Instead of approving the best projects, officials end up funding those that look best on paper."

That quote sums up the Deep-bore. It's not the best tunnel, nor the ideal solution. The best tunnel is WsDOT's Scenario 'G' 4-lane Cut-n-cover drafted after the March 2007 voter rejection. The ideal solution is the Surface/I-5/Transit because it takes into account the reality of our insane amount of vehicle traffic and provides travel options.

As for the surface boulevard option being prone to cost overruns, that's ridiculous. Meet the new boss. Same as the old boss.

Sound Transit is not trustworthy. U-Link Tunnel is not as productive as extensions south and east. If extensions to West Seattle and Ballard prove viable, they too would be more productive than U-Link. Go ahead. Put billions into holes in the ground. I'm not against tunnels. I just expect them to pass critical analysis. U-Link runs through completely developed districts already well-served with transit. On paper, U-Link ridership is rigged to look good.

The point raised by this study is that every project with rare exception goes over budget. I don't think this is stunning news to most of us. What is more critical is how the inevitable overrun is handled. So many of Seattle's large public projects are flawed by the slashing of features and shortcuts taken to reach the final product. The Kingdome exterior was not intended to have exposed ramps on the exterior. I-5 southbound wound up with off-ramps to 520 on the left side of the freeway. Light rail was supposed to go to the University. All of these design disasters are the result of engineers trying to bring these huge projects back under budget at the last minute. The question of whether the Tunnel becomes a boondoggle is answered by what features get cut in the end.

The current viaduct solution is like the tale of the group of blind people describing an elephant. It is a transportation project that has been conceived by public relations people working for real estate speculators. No one knows what the outcome will be since the agenda had little to with transportation…just a way to knock the viaduct down.

What is known is that it is the most expensive, most speculative solution that will have less capacity than what we have now. What a bargain. The viaduct should be replaced or refurbished and ways to do it should be honestly considered.

This process beginning with the phony referendum of 2007 has been like watching an auto accident happen in slow motion. I can only hope that the recent council vote hurrying this tunnel lunacy forward will result in future election outcomes similar to what our current mayor just experienced.

Rebuild the damaged viaduct section. Retrofit the rest. Problem solved.

afreeman: I hope you aren't suggesting that we stop building jets and writing software, but I think you have a point. There is some kind of logic gap in how we do things, or at least a lack of common sense. However, I do think this tunnel is the most practical outcome for the viaduct, I don't see any other solution that could have worked.

unter: I agree with your argument and didn't mean to be so confusing about the software--I meant that I saw no problem with you asserting that. The other two though are not as far fetched as you imply. Plus yourstands very well on its own assuming your facts are correct.

I do wish though that they will rethink the current scheme for turning the waterfront into a neither of neither hybrid.

24 hours in Seattle:

* Council votes 9-0 to go ahead with tunnel. Orders commemorative hard hats and shovels from Amazon online.

* Mike McGinn caves. Hope the tunnel doesn't!

* Joe Mallahan crows.

* Sightline, having apparently forgotten to change its wall calendar, wakes up and releases its speculative report, misinterpreting the only large-scale study in its footnotes (the Danish study).

* Local press/bloggers wanna know, who has Tunnel Vision?

* Is it too late to convert the Viaduct into a sewage canal?

Don't be absurd, it is never too late to convert the Viaduct into a sewage canal.

Just as it is never too late to do the same thing to the Seattle Center.
http://crosscut.com/2007/10/11/real-estate/8149/

Ok, my turn at a headline for next January:
Promanade Funding Deal Breaker for McGinn

As others have pointed out, this is a fluff piece. Like many other people and organizations, Sightline has prostituted itself to the McGinn Campaign. The two factors Sightline cited to explain the under-budget performance of the 1989 Mt. Baker are also true of the deep-bore viaduct replacement tunnel: knowledge from previous tunneling and construction during a recession. There are not one but two tunnels in the immediate vicinity of the deep-bore tunnel and hundreds, possibly thousands of geotechnical reports for high-rise buildings in the area. The current recession has resulted in plummeting construction costs. The contingency for the deep-bore tunnel is 35% not 22%. More tunnel analysis at wwww.lightandair.wordpress.com.

YES!

Inplainair (David),

You've got a very odd line of criticism. In the report, I specifically point out the very things you mention in your "critique" here. In some ways, the Mt Baker tunnel is a decent analogue; in other ways, not so much. (Not surprisingly, because it came in under budget, supporters like to cite it while ignoring other possible analogues.)

It's true that the Mt Baker tunnel benefited from recession-era prices (as I point out in the report), but it also used a completely different kind of tunneling technology, it occurred in a different geology, and it the bored portion is only about 1/6th as long as the deep-bore tunnel would be. Plus, no major urban area overhead. Moreover, the cost baseline for Mt Baker (and the other projects) was based on a much more thoroughly designed stage than we had when the deep-bore tunnel estimates were made.

As Knute rightly says: there is no apples-to-apples comparison. The honest thing to do is to examine a number of major recent tunneling projects in the area. We should take a look at their similarities and differences, not just focus on the one we think best supports our presuppositions. ST's Beacon Hill and Brightwater used similar boring technology, for instance, but are different in other respects, such as diameter. The downtown bus tunnel is in the same location and is roughly the same length, but used much different construction methods. Etc.

Whatever. It's all in the report.

BTW, the correct number is 22%. Wash DOT's tunnel cost estimates are here: http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/Projects/Viaduct/TunnelCostEstimate.htm. The $418 million line-item for "risk" is 22% of the tunnel's $1.913 total estimated price tag. That's why everyone uses the 22% number.

-- Eric de Place, Sightline

This article is spot on, except I think that many of the politicians are still in office once their creations are revealed to be way over budget and underutilized, whichever the case might be, as it's the lobbyists footing the bulk of the politicians' re-election campaigns who share the blame. Lucky for the politicians, unless it's something as obvious as Boston's "Big Dig" debacle, most voters re-elect them anyway. It would be an interesting statistic to know how many politicians are re-elected! The fact is, the politicos and many private companies, for that matter, underestimate and overpromise for exactly the reasons cited. A classic example is the recent Seattle Monorail, except they *way* underestimated their financial situation, probably as they expected a narrow victory, which - if so - was about the only thing they accurately projected. It's almost a Catch 22 situation, however...if the price tag is too high and the perceived benefits too low, nothing would ever get approved, at least until the problem became so obvious that the remedy would take years and perhaps decades to fix. The hugely-expensive, but lobbyist-rich light rail contingent figured it better, though, starting high and settling for lesser when the perceived problem and/or frustration had grown bad enough. The improved way of making decisions would include a radical change to how politicians are financed and lobbied, and something to make people accountable, like an annual report card with the list of promises, promisers, and actual results - or lack thereof.

I misread the dates. However the point is the same...the more recent projects tend to be a lot more accurate in their estimates, and nobody involved with the "study" seems to know much.

For example, does the study factor in the cost of delays due to politics or litigation? Do they escalate estimates to provide a fair baseline that reflects starting a year later, or several years later?

With projects in the past few years, pretty much everything exploded in price. Remember when Seattle fire stations were bidding at 30% and 40% over estimates a couple years ago? Is that because they were tunnels? No...global material prices spiked, and each level of the general-sub-subsub-supplier chain got a bit more margin. Nobody expects a price spike like that in the coming years.

When Capitol Hill tunnel segment bids come in dramatically under budget, does that get figured into the analysis? Sure they're not built yet, but how about the "what does it mean" discussion at the end? Maybe I'm missing it...

Looming behind these expected cost overruns is the requirement by the City to take sole responsibility of them. I have not seen much written here about this amendment our friend and neighbor State Speaker of the House Frank Chopp inserted into the legislation. This seems like a way for Olympia to find a new way of funding state transportation projects - low-ball construction estimates and budgets, require local jurisdictions to take liablity for overruns and force the creation of LID's in the end to pay the inevitable bill due. This sounds like a great way for Olympia to shirk their one of their primary duties. Ultimately every part of the state with a road is going to have an LID.

You do know there is 800 million in fluff, right?
1.9 b estimated in January
+ 400 milin tolls (padded by the legislature)
and if needed + 400 million more in tolls.

If the 1.9 billion dollar tunnel goes over 2.8 billion dollars then the state's unenforceable clause kicks in.

"Survival of the un-fittest. Instead of approving the best projects, officials end up funding those that look best on paper."

U-Link looks good on paper. The truth is, its predicted ridership is based mostly on bus riders becoming rail riders. Deep-bore looks good on paper, less disruption to waterfront district (in the short-term). In the long-term, it produces a new Alaskan Way that is burdened with traffic, but that's not a part of the report on paper or in public discussion.

"The problem, Flyvberg says, is not having a strong, independent process or bureaucracy to bring objective, rigorous analysis to projects." And blog commentators are no more attuned to rigorous analysis than bureaucratic agency department heads and elected leaders, many of whom have little more to say than, "I vote and I say getterdone."

The Deep-bore is a mistake.

Eric,

My understanding is that WSDOT has totally revamped its cost estimating in the last few years using the CEVP/Cost Estimate Validation Process and that 35% of the estimated cost for the tunnel is for contingencies - I assume that includes both normal and special risk contingencies. WSDOT has started delivering projects on budget with this new technique.

My point stands. To the extent that tunnels are comparable the Mt. Baker tunnel most resembles the deep-bore tunnel in the critical factors we can judge today: knowledge of the geography and construction climate. This should lead you to a conclusion that the tunnel is likely to come in under budget - and it is. You (and Sightline) are not qualified to compare the other technical factors you cite due to lack of expertise and/or lack of information - I call your fluff.

David

David,

The engineering knowledge of the geology under downtown is less well-formed than the knowledge of the Mt Baker ridge was at the time of that tunnel's construction. I don't think you can find an expert who would say otherwise. The construction climate is similar as I note in the report (though economic forecasts are inherently tricky), but it surprises me that you don't think it relevant that the tunneling technologies are drastically different; that the lengths are hardly comparable; and that the surrounding environment is much more high-stakes for the deep bore tunnel. For example, even a limited amount of surface settlement, as I believe happened with Mt Baker, could be a major issue downtown.

But look, I think the Mt Baker experience is worth taking into account. That's why I include it in the report. I'm just mystified that you don't think Seattle's other tunneling experiences -- particularly those recent ones that used tunnel boring machines (Beacon Hill and Brightwater) -- are worth considering.

It seems to me that the responsible thing to do would be to develop careful cost estimates based on more thorough engineering. Only then, after we know more, would it be prudent to evaluate whether we can pay for it -- and who will pick up the tab. (Speaking as a Seattle property taxpayer, I'm not wild about rushing ahead with a project that could end up sticking me with a hefty bill.)

I take it you disagree? You think we already know enough -- and that the current cost estimates and funding arrangements are more than adequate?

-- Eric de Place, Sightline

"Some people still cling to the idea that the viaduct can be retrofitted or rebuilt in situ, but...that cause many years of paralyzing, expensive gridlock in downtown Seattle"

Well, just look at the drawing of the proposed tunnel. Does it look like it holds any more traffic than the current viaduct does? And, we already have the viaduct. Shutting down such a vital arterial for years, while we amass debt that will not be paid off for generations - how does that make sense?

Seattle Observer, the viaduct wouldn't be shut down during the project, except briefly to complete connections between new and existing. (If every opponent knew this basic fact, this would be a much easier debate!)

This is a good way for young politicians to get attention: we already know the bored tunnel is going to take much longer and cost much more. Speak out against it now and look like a damn genius 7 years from now when it's turned into Seattle's "Big Dig."

This will sound either sacrilegious, as if I'm trying to block the project, or perhaps just that I want people to die, but why do we need shoulders in the tunnel? Padding the road with 12 feet of shoulders must add incredibly to the cost? Reducing speed like in the Battery Street Tunnel would slim chances of accidents. I bet we could pay for a ton of hours of tow-truck standby for the savings of reduced diameter of tunnel.

Europe and Asia have been going shoulderless for years. Is their engineering faulty? Why do we have to design roads for cars that break down every other week? What's the story?

Here's the new expressway opened in Tokyo a couple of years back. There are some insane things about this expressway, including the cost: $1 million per meter. But they took measures to reduce cost -- like removing shoulders. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiYut_irPSA

Tokyo built a new subway at the same time as the expressway, connecting the same nodes (Ikebukuro to Shibuya), at 1/4 the cost per linear meter at around $250k/meter (including stations etc).

Our waterfront's bored tunnel itself at $1.9 billion estimated is $594k/meter. So we could get two subways instead? Probably not apples to apples, but an interesting perspective. Oddly, if you add in the new south waterfront viaduct, the price per linear meter actually goes up to $674k/meter. More lanes?

I am anticipating being attacked for using a flawed accounting measure.

Quinn, that's a funny misconception you have!