The dim prospects for success in Obama's strategy
He has a narrow base of support for his Afghanistan policy, and the facts on the ground make his timetable unrealistic.
By Ted Van Dyk
December 02, 2009.
Under pressure over the past two years, in both his presidential campaign and presidency, President Barack Obama has always delivered an effective speech at critical junctures. He did in again Tuesday night at West Point with his well delivered presentation on policy in Afghanistan (and Pakistan). But, afterward, I must confess to a feeling of overall sadness about events that are almost certain to follow.
As I expected, Obama made a split-the-difference speech, intended to please both those who want a withdrawal and those who want an escalation. He pledged to dispatch 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan (rather than the 40,000 requested by military commanders). They won't get there, however, until the early months of 2010. And, he pledged, they will leave at mid-2011.
One conservative critic remarked last night that "our troops will be leaving before they get there." That is not literally true, of course, but it carries the seeds of truth. Afghanistan is not Iraq, where staging areas could be established in neighboring Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Beyond the troops themselves, the whole infrastructure needed for the effort will need to be trans-shipped with difficulty over a period of months, then dismantled immediately for shipment home.
Sen. John McCain and other supporters of a stronger Afghan/Pakistan effort remarked that, by setting a 2011 withdrawal date — and specifying our areas of concentration in the war effort — Obama was making it easy for Taliban and Al Qaida adversaries. They could have added that the specific pullout date also would discourage Afghans, in particular, from collaborating in our effort. Knowing we were leaving, they would lie low and simply await the Taliban takeover they expected to follow in 18 months.
Seattle Congressman Jim McDermott, for one, faulted the Obama decision and asked for a near-term withdrawal. He represents a strong strain of opinion among Democratic House members whose patience with the Afghan commitment already has run out.
In his speech Obama left out previous rhetoric about civilian aid programs in Afghanistan and "nation building." He also omitted the usual recitation of Taliban offenses against women, children, and civilized standards of conduct. He stuck with a vital-national-interest argument and, for the first time effectively stressed the strong connection between the Afghan commitment and the effort to stop Islamic fundamentalists from gaining control of a nuclear-armed Pakistan (or even some weapons themselves, which he said almost certainly would be used against us if Al Qaida succeeded in acquiring them).
What induced my sad feeling is not the speech itself but the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the home-front political climate. These factors almost guarantee that Obama's troop reinforcements will not be sufficient and that his timetable cannot be kept.
Months will have passed before the fresh troops can bring reasonable security to populated areas more than 1,000 yards from the presidential palace in Kabul. Planned offensives against the Taliban, in their stronghold areas, would require more troops than the 100,000 which will be there after the planned buildup. The square miles of radical Islamist activity, across Afghan/Pak border areas, cannot begin to be covered effectively.
Obama tried to put the best face on the present Afghan and Pak governments. But they are, indeed, both ineffectual and corrupt. In Pakistan, in particular, opinion is not swinging our way but mistakenly blames the United States for the violence being visited on their country. (Irrational, yes. This is like blaming a police force for bringing violence to a neighborhood by chasing and apprehending armed criminals there.)
Obama spoke of training and strengthening Afghan military and police forces. But, in a country ruled largely by tribes and warlords (and threatened by a near-term takeover by the Taliban), it will be difficult indeed to recruit and train Afghans pledging loyalty to a tenuous central government. (About like recruiting South Vietnamese for South Vietnamese forces when Hanoi's eventual victory already was apparent.)
At home, Obama almost certainly faces the same trends that overtook Presidents Harry Truman, during the Korean War, and Lyndon Johnson, during the Vietnam War. Quite popular on taking office, they saw their approval ratings fall precipitously as the wars proceeded. Neither could seek a second presidential term. President George W. Bush, conducting the Iraq War, got his second term but left office with all-time-low approval ratings which, in part, brought Obama and strong Democratic congressional majorities to power.
Obama's only reliable base of support for his war policy is among solidly Republican voters. Independent voters are trending toward opposition. Most Democrats already oppose the involvement. Those trends can be expected to intensify in coming months, especially when on-the-ground American casualties begin to increase, as they will after the buildup.
Obama inherited the problem. But Afghanistan, in particular, has now become "his war." He has sharply increased spending and troop levels there since taking office. Now he is doing it again.
Add disquiet over health-care reform, and the state of the economy, to the equation and we face a period of even deeper political polarization than now exists. Barring unexpected developments, Democratic congressional majorities will be sharply reduced in 2010 off-year elections, and control of the House conceivably could go to Republicans. That would stop dead any remaining chance for a residual Obama agenda in the second half of his term.
Obama had no good options from which to choose. Because of their difficulty, his policy review lasted several months. His speech Tuesday night represented an attempt to hold together a tenuous coalition behind his decided policy. It is likely to dissolve even before the 30,000 fresh troops and their equipment can get to Afghanistan a few months hence.
Obama's review of his options certainly was undertaken with greater and more measured consideration than either LBJ or George W. Bush devoted to similar exercises regarding Vietnam and Iraq. But, if you don't hold the cards, you simply cannot win the hand. The best we can hope for, probably, is that Pak nuclear weapons do not fall into Al Qaida/Taliban hands and that a viable Pak government can continue to govern. In Afghanistan, the locals no doubt are already making their calculations toward survival after our announced departure in 2011.
Comments:
Posted Wed, Dec 2, 12:24 p.m. Inappropriate
As I listened to the speech, I also couldn't help but worry about whether the commitment necessary to achieve our goals exceeds our willingness to invest. I wondered if the July 2011 date was announced because it is calculated to be the latest that Americans will accept, rather than what was really necessary to carry out the mission.
Another tightrope in the speech is our relationship with the Karzai government. On the one hand, it is becoming clear that we are going to have to bypass the central government for a lot of our work. On the other hand, we are stuck with Karzai for quite some time to come. How did such a worthless ruler get put there in the first place anyway? Anyway, I appreciate Obama's effort to force the Karzai government to get its act together, though I can't say I am very optimistic about that.
One thing in this piece that I do have to criticize. I don't think that it is realistic that Al Qaeda / Taliban forces are going to be able to take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Even if the Pakistani government doesn't have full control over some of its territory, the government itself will stay in place, Pakistani civil society as a whole is quite strong, and the nuclear weapons are secure. I don't mean to minimize the importance of controlling the insurgency in Pakistan--people are being ruthlessly killed--but let us not exaggerate the dangers either.
Posted Wed, Dec 2, 1:39 p.m. Inappropriate
Pepper: I hope you are right about Pak nuclear weapons. But we can't be complacent about the possibility that Islamic extremists either could takeover power in Pakistan and/or somehow acquire a nuke weapon or technology. It is the presence of the nukes, above all, that compels us to do whatever is necessary to safeguard stability in Pakistan. (The same is true, for instance, about safeguarding the stability of oil-rich Gulf states which also are being targeted by Al Qaida).
My article of last Sunday suggested that, while focusing mainly on Pakistan, we should begin to make our bargain now with Afghan tribal and regional leaders, including non-extremist Taliban, in order to plan an orderly exit from the country. I fear our objective there, as stated last night by Obama, is just not achievable and not worth the money, lives, and credibility that will be lost in trying for it. Demoralizing to think of what likely is coming.
Posted Thu, Dec 3, 8:28 a.m. Inappropriate
Here's fine take on the policy and its origins:
:Obama’s speech on Afghanistan: A compendium of lies
3 December 2009
In his December 1 speech at West Point announcing the deployment of 30,000 more US troops to Afghanistan, President Barack Obama attempted to justify a major escalation of a deeply unpopular war on the basis of lies and distortions. That he had to resort to such falsifications reflects both the reactionary character of his policy and the fact that it is being imposed in violation of the popular will.
To justify the escalation, Obama recycled the Bush administration’s myths about the “war on terror.” He cynically presented the US as an altruistic power, forced into a global war for democracy by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
As he sought to frame US imperialist policy within the template of the “war on terror,” however, his speech descended into utter incoherence.
Obama’s account of the US’ recent wars contradicted his own assertion that Washington was single-mindedly pursuing Al Qaeda. In 2001, he said, the US attacked Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda—though most of the September 11 hijackers were, in fact, from Saudi Arabia, the US’ major Arab ally in the Middle East.
The US invasion was legitimate, he argued, because Afghanistan was Al Qaeda’s base of operations and the Taliban regime harbored and protected the terrorist group.
Obama brushed over the failure of the US invasion to dismantle Al Qaeda by saying that “after escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, Al Qaeda’s leadership established a safe haven there.”
Thus, from 2002 to 2009, the US pursued wars in Iraq and Afghanistan supposedly directed against Al Qaeda, while the latter was based in another country altogether—Pakistan, a long-standing US ally.
Obama even suggested that Al Qaeda enjoys the protection of sections of the Pakistani state, declaring, “[T]here have been those in Pakistan who have argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little, or seeking accommodation with those who use violence.”
This account raises an obvious and unexplained double standard. If the security of the American people required the US to invade Afghanistan and remove an Al Qaeda-friendly regime there, why shouldn’t the same apply to the government of Pakistan?
Instead, Obama hailed Pakistan as an ally in the struggle against “violent extremism” and called for a US-Pakistan partnership based on “mutual trust.”
This only demonstrates the fraudulent character of the official rationale for the war, which Obama and the rest of the US political establishment know to be a tissue of lies.
Then there is the question of the Afghan government in whose defense the US is supposedly waging war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. While initially praising the regime of President Hamid Karzai as a “legitimate government,” Obama went on to acknowledge that it suffers from “corruption, the drug trade, an underdeveloped economy, and insufficient security forces.”
In a display of utter cynicism, he claimed that Karzai’s recent reelection, universally recognized as the outcome of fraud and ballot-stuffing, had nevertheless produced a legitimate government. “Although it was marred by fraud,” Obama said, “that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan’s laws and Constitution.”
Obama’s attempts to give noble-sounding reasons for deploying 30,000 more US troops were as sinister as they were self-contradictory. In Orwellian style, he told the Afghan people, who have already suffered US occupation for eight years, “We have no interest in occupying your country.”
He contrasted the US’ allegedly benevolent attitude towards Afghanistan with the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979-1989. In fact, the US has manipulated Afghan politics for 30 years.
Beginning in 1979, the US financed and backed Islamic fundamentalist resistance to the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, with the aim of provoking a Soviet invasion. Thus the US was politically complicit in millions of Afghan deaths during the Soviet occupation and the civil war that followed. The Islamist forces Washington is fighting today in Afghanistan largely descend from groups it supported against the Soviets in the 1980s.
Amid wars that have cost over a million lives and have involved the widespread use of torture at US-run prisons, Obama insisted that US policy will “tend to the light of freedom, and justice, and opportunity, and respect for the dignity of all peoples.”
Obama boasted of having ended torture—an empty and false claim belied by reports of ongoing torture at US prisons in Afghanistan and elsewhere, as well as Obama’s continuation of rendition and his opposition to any investigation of government officials who ordered and oversaw the use of torture.
He reiterated his pledge to close Guantanamo, but was silent on his insistence that US torture prisons in Afghanistan, such as at the Bagram military base, remain open.
The central lie in Obama’s speech, however, was the claim that his escalation plans would allow US troops to return quickly from Afghanistan, starting in 2011.
In fact, as Obama indicated elsewhere in his speech, this escalation is one step in plans for even broader wars. “The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly,” he said, “and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Mentioning Somalia and Yemen as potential targets, he added, “our effort will involve disorderly regions and diffuse enemies.”
The inclusion of this passage made clear that Obama was basing his Afghan policy on a report issued last month by Anthony Cordesman of the influential Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Cordesman wrote: “The President must be frank about the fact that any form of victory in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be part of a much wider and longer struggle. He must make it clear that the ideological, demographic, governance, economic, and other pressures that divide the Islamic world mean the world will face threats in many other nations that will endure indefinitely into the future. He should mention the risks in Yemen and Somalia, make it clear that the Iraq war is not over, and warn that we will still face both a domestic threat and a combination of insurgency and terrorism that will continue to extend from Morocco to the Philippines, and from Central Asia deep into Africa, regardless of how well we do in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
He added: “…the present level of US, allied, Afghan and Pakistani casualties will almost certainly double and probably more than triple before something approaching victory is won.”
In short, the US will be fighting immensely costly wars over a considerable portion of the earth’s surface, in regions stretching thousands of miles in every direction.
Reduced to its essentials, the perspective of Obama and his advisors is a future of endless war to maintain the US’ position as the global hegemon. Beyond the questions of controlling oil revenues and trade routes in the Middle East and Central Asia, what is at stake is the US’ position as a world power. Like the British withdrawal from Suez in 1956-1957, a forced US withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a devastating blow to Washington’s prestige.
Obama’s Afghan policy arises from this dynamic of US imperialism: Since retreat at any point threatens catastrophe, he chooses ever-expanding escalation.
Alex Lantier
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/dec2009/pers-d03.shtml
Posted Thu, Dec 3, 4:46 p.m. Inappropriate
I have to agree with the critics who argue for a disengagement. The likelihood of winning, as Mr. Van Dyk asserts, is small and, even if we "win", what we are faced with an open-ended obligation to support, both financially and militarily, a make-believe nation. This is not like VietNam or Iraq, both of which have a culture and capability to function in this century. When we are out of Iraq, I believe it will go on as some sort of authoritarian state, maybe hostile to us, maybe not but it will be a nation (OK, maybe three nations). I don't know if I agree with mikerol or not (I have a hard time reading comments that are so long).
It just doesn't look like there can be any happy ending. It would have taken a lot of courage for Obama to cut us loose (abandoning his campaign arguments) and his popularity may have taken huge dip but I think he would have been doing us a favor.