Ring the alarm: Hanford's lack of a nuclear safety culture
Three employees have filed complaints against the nuclear waste storage facility in the last seven months, highlighting an alarming trend as Hanford moves forward with a new project to convert nuclear waste into radioactive glass tubes.
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During the packed public meeting, the DOE, Bechtel, and URS officials began discussing the glassification project. The DOE officials included Ines Triay, DOE's nationwide cleanup czar until July 2011.
At the hearing, Busche gave the defense board a different technical answer than DOE officials on the physics of aerosol particles dispersing and falling to the ground. That angered Triay enough that she chewed out Busche afterward in a room filled with 50 URS employees, declaring that if Busche's "intent was to piss people off (with her testimony), (she) did a very good job," according to Busche's labor department complaint.
On Oct. 8, 2010, according to Busche's complaint, three high-ranking contractor officials — Frank Russo, Bechtel's glassification project manager, Leo Sain, a senior URS vice president, and Bill Gay, a URS assistant project manager — approached Busche one-by-one to ask if she would be willing to change her answer on the aerosol dispersion matter. "She understood their questions to imply she should recant her earlier testimony," Busche's complaint said. She refused.
Later, in January 2011, another of Busche's supervisors, Mike Coyle, told her "to stop putting technical and safety issues in writing to him, and to instead come to him in person with these issues, so as to avoid making a written record," her complaint read. In an interview, Busche said she believed this was to eliminate paper trails for future potential problems.
During the Tamosaitis case, In May 2011, Busche was deposed, identifying many of his technical concerns as valid.
Then in October 2011, Busche's superiors gave a "corrective action letter" for having one of her people run an errand for her while that employee was on a lunch break. She believes the letter was the start of a paperwork trail to terminate her. According to her complaint, another supervisor told Busche that "people want her fired."
"URS and (Bechtel) are currently engaged in retaliatory efforts in order to remove Ms. Busche from her assignment at URS," her complaint explained.
Meanwhile, Doss was working for WPRS in a separate part of Hanford's tank waste world, just west of the glassification complex under construction. In Hanford slang, this spot is called the "tank farms" — home to the 177 underground tanks holding 53 million gallons of nuclear waste.
Doss began as a blue-collar tank farmer worker and rose through the ranks to a professional-level safety job in WRPS's environmental permitting division. Her clashes with her superiors continued after she reached an initial settlement with the company over a 2009 complaint about being retaliated against for raising safety concerns.
Towards the end of 2010, the first of several new disputes arose. Doss argued that rainwater catchment systems in the tank farms should be put on a state wastewater discharge permit. Her superior disagreed. Later, Doss filed a complaint when she discovered that on-call supervisors were not properly logging after-hours technical incidents. Her superiors promptly removed her from her after-hours on-call supervisory duties.
Then in January 2011, Doss was assigned to supervise permitting activities for 50 to 60 underground wells in the tank farm area that collected rain and construction-related water — potentially contaminated by flowing through radioactive soil. She soon discovered that no one could physically find these wells, despite previous supervisors having reported checking them annually for at least the last 10 years. Doss' predecessor in the post refused to cooperate with her in locating the lost wells.
Doss' immediate supervisor, Jack Donnelly, instructed her to pick the brains of Hanford old-timers, but after several months, she had found only 14 of the wells. Meanwhile, Doss' complaint alleges that Donnelly told her not to include him on emails and other correspondence on the matter, and not to approach him directly on the subject. Doss believes that Donnelly wanted to create as scarce a paper trail as possible. In June 2011, Donnelly formally took away Doss's duties and responsibilities, her complaint alleged.
On Oct. 3, 2011, she was officially laid off. "It was like a gut shot," she said.
According to Doss, she was one of only two employees laid off from her 30-40 person section and only five of her co-workers had more than 10 years of experience. Doss believed she had the second-most seniority.
In a written statement released April 28, the WPRS said that it disagreed with Doss' allegations and will contest them before the labor department. "Each WRPS employee is empowered and encouraged to raise safety and other workplace concerns," the statement said. "Ms. Doss was one of 244 employees who were laid off by WRPS in the fall of 2011 to align its employment level with project work scope and federal funding. Ms. Doss' raising of safety or environmental concerns was not a factor in her selection for lay-off."
Both Bechtel and WPRS declined to speak in detail about Busche and Doss' allegations, citing ongoing litigation. Bechtel, URS, and DOE took similar stances when questioned in the past on Tamosaitis' claims.
Critics contend that the frequent turnover in top DOE and contractor officials — along with contracts with few, if any, penalties for mistakes — have created a culture that encourages turning a blind eye to bad news.
According to Tomasaitis, top officials at Hanford spend only two to four years at the site before moving elsewhere to continue their careers. Bechtel's Hanford operation has had five managers since 2001, according to Carpenter. That trend creates pressure for managers to look good while they are there, but makes it impossible to hold anyone accountable for the long-term consequences of taking design and safety shortcuts, which usually only appear after managers have moved on.
Tom Carpenter has been a long-time lawyer for Hanford whistleblowers, including all three of the current complainants. "There is no continuity there or in the Department of Energy," he said.
"We look at Hanford as an accountability-free zone," said Carpenter. "It doesn't matter how many screw-ups there are, there is always more money [to tackle the fix-it work]. They have contracts that don't actually penalize them for messing up." Carpenter cited a recent federal inspector general's report that reported that the DOE did not try to get Bechtel to refund $15 million for paid work that the contractor could not prove had been done properly.
As Busche describes it, Hanford contractors can make mistakes, watch costs rise, and see schedules delayed — and still be paid extra to tackle the fix-it work.
"There is no penalty for a contractor being wrong," she explained.
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Comments:
Posted Thu, May 17, 9:46 a.m. Inappropriate
Monkey business as usual. The Hanford Dangerous Waste permit is up for comment until September 30th. Review the draft permit at www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/nwp/permitting/hdwp/ . Contact Heart of America
www.heartofamerica.org for the many "details" not on the State website.
Also see www.hanfordwatch.org for even moreup-to-date info that Hanford managers don't wamt you to know about, and then submit your comments.
Posted Thu, May 17, 10:13 a.m. Inappropriate
"Doss' immediate supervisor, Jack Donnelly, instructed her to pick the brains of Hanford old-timers, but after several months, she had found only 14."
The significance of this datum of course depends entirely on how many heads were found. If, as I suspect, only 14 brains were found remaining among the couple thousand total heads belonging to former Hanford employees, then this would indicate an alarmingly high rate of deterioration -- each brain likely having a half-life of less than five years. It thus becomes imperative that the few brains still left be immediately donated to Science for further study before they too disappear from the face of the planet, or from Hanford, whichever occurs first.
Posted Thu, May 17, 10:55 a.m. Inappropriate
Actually the "14" referred to is the number of old wells that she was able to locate, out of the 50 or so that were on the status list. The importance of this information is that the company had been reporting the status of these wells for many years...but clearly without even checking on the location of the wells, much less verifying the status of the wells for environmental compliance purposes.
Posted Thu, May 17, 4:48 p.m. Inappropriate
Thanks for the update. I stand corrected. (I'm sitting, actually.) You might want to check out my comment on a previous article that at this point it would better sense to just leave Hanford alone and glassify the Tri-Cities instead.
Posted Thu, May 17, 10:57 a.m. Inappropriate
Hanford Challenge has been tracking this issue for years. See our website at www.hanfordchallenge.org to learn more about the safety culture issues and the nuclear safety and environmental challenges posed by Hanford's ongoing cleanup.
Posted Sat, May 19, 9:24 p.m. Inappropriate
There is no shortage of people who can put their finger on the problem. What is needed is someone at the top who can turn it around and make this a successful project. It can not be successful if senior managers ignore or avoid confronting technical issues.
Where would the Nuclear Navy be if Admiral Rickover's organization acted like the Hanford Bunch? The USS Nimitz would never had made it.
FACTOID: The DOE senior safety manager slept through my 2002 ANS presentation (see my web site) on how the Nuclear Navy managed to build the USS Nimitz on time, using fundamentally different leadership and management than is currently in place at Hanford (both Bechtel and DOE). The chickens are coming home to roost, so I am pleased about that, but not so happy about the WTP and its failure to face reality.
Bechtel and DOE simply do not know how such things have to be done, and neither does the NRC. DNFSB is very good at identifying problems, and they like to use self-serving language like "They don't ALWAYS.." gag-me-with-a-spoon in their reports, but they don't know how to actually do the project right, either. NNSA is better since they tend to face reality (a lot of Navy people who work very hard and tend to face facts).
I may be the only one left from the Nimitz PRECOMMUNIT Reactor Department who is not yet retired, but it would take a Presidential Executive Order to get me to help these guys. All those SES's and Senior Project Managers and they still have whistle blowers coming out their ears. Does not happen in the Navy.
FACTOID: Does anyone remember Jim Stone from Rocky Flats Plant (1989)? He did DOE a big favor by warning about Pu in the Pu-building ducts, but he still lost his job despite the independent criticality safety team's discoveries and the report that proved him right. He died a pauper, ignored by DOE and the DOE GC. Hanford will not succeed under any of these people, and the whistle blowers will get screwed by Bechtel as well as DOE, as usual.
It is only a matter of time before Bechtel fails, gets fired, and another company gets to try it again. Technology is based on facts and reality, not on wishful thinking!
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